The source introduces the central premise of the upcoming book, A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (LIH), by clarifying what the hypothesis is not concerned with and identifying its true focus. The author establishes that the LIH does not address trivial misunderstandings that are easily resolved with context, such as basic polysemy or syntactic jokes like the Groucho Marx line, since these examples show language merely being flexible, not fundamentally failing. Instead, the hypothesis concentrates on Contestables, which are terms like 'justice' or 'freedom' that appear stable but conceal structurally incompatible conceptual frameworks between different groups, leading to the illusion of shared meaning. The text argues that when these words are used, communication often proceeds only because the term is misleadingly taken as agreed upon, forcing concrete discussion to abandon the contested word to gain clarity. This abandonment, according to the author, confirms the primary insufficiency of language at complex conceptual levels, demonstrating that words can fundamentally mislead rather than just underperform.👉 http://philosophics.blog

This excerpt, drawn from "The Indeterminacy of Law and Morality," presents a highly personal and intellectual journey into the foundational flaws of jurisprudence. The author begins by describing their intense, continuous cycle of reading and writing, driven by caffeine and a relentless pursuit of clarity in their work. The narrative then shifts to the author’s use of AI tools like ChatGPT to refine arguments and discover essential, previously missed intellectual references, specifically highlighting the influence of Bernard Williams on their moral philosophy. The central crisis of the text revolves around the author's discovery of admissions in legal textbooks, such as those by Endicott, which openly state that law is fundamentally vague, its application is often unconstrained by rules, and its moral value is optional, suggesting it operates primarily as a power structure. This revelation causes the author significant professional distress, leading them to question the widespread wilful ignorance and silence within the legal profession regarding these inherent limitations of the rule of law.👉 https://philosophics.blog/2025/12/16/i-need-a-break/

The provided text announces the launch of a new tool, the Language Insufficiency GPT, created in anticipation of the January 2026 publication of the author’s book, A Language Insufficiency Hypothesis. This GPT is designed to exploit a familiar failure mode in communication, which the author describes as the common assumption that language is stable and that concrete words mean what one thinks they mean. The core hypothesis suggests that while simple words like 'table' are reliable, abstract concepts such as 'freedom', 'justice', or 'truth' are inherently unstable units that allow people to glide over hard problems while sounding reasonable. The author presents the tool as something that can offer entertainment and mild discomfort before the book is released, challenging users to recognise when they are arguing with an opponent based on their own assumptions.👉 https://philosophics.blog/2025/12/15/meet-the-language-insufficiency-gpt/

The provided text introduces a family of analytical frameworks—the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (LIH), the Mediated Encounter Ontology of the World (MEOW), and Disagreement Without Referees—which are described as lenses or diagnostics rather than a unified system or grand theory. These frameworks target three specific sites where traditional Enlightenment expectations fail: language, ontological access, and moral/political adjudication. Each lens explains why a crucial function fails reliably yet stubbornly persists, focusing on representational limits in language, the unmediated nature of experience, and the absence of neutral ground for resolving profound conflict. The source emphasises that these frameworks refuse the instinct to rebuild or offer solutions, instead operating as a post-foundational critique that highlights the problematic nature of the demand for closure and final answers. Ultimately, they share the posture of having no privileged access, no neutral ground, and no final synthesis.👉 http://philosophics.blog

The provided text is an academic essay titled, "Disagreement Without Referees: Ontological Incommensurability and the Limits of Moral Adjudication," authored by independent scholar Bry Willis. The central thesis challenges the common belief that persistent moral and political disagreements are remediable failures of communication or reasoning, arguing instead that they often stem from ontological incommensurability, meaning the conflicting parties operate with fundamentally incompatible background commitments about what is real and what grounds normativity. Willis distinguishes between correctable "disagreements of opinion" and irresolvable "disagreements of ontology," suggesting that conflating the two leads to frustration and misdiagnosis. The paper is diagnostic rather than prescriptive, aiming to clarify why certain conflicts resist resolution by rejecting the expectation of neutral adjudication or "referees" and embracing the reality of "commitment without guarantees" in a pluralistic moral landscape. Willis addresses and accepts the common philosophical charges of relativism and subjectivism, but rejects the typical inference that these positions entail quietism or the collapse of all moral meaning.📝Essay: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17932544

The provided philosophical essay examines why many significant disagreements persist, arguing that these conflicts are often misdiagnosed as mere differences of opinion rather than deeper, structural mismatches. The author, a philosopher of language, suggests that many entrenched disputes occur across "ontological fault lines", meaning the parties do not share fundamental assumptions about what constitutes reality or truth. The text uses examples, such as the abortion debate and critiques of institutional harm, to illustrate how shared vocabulary can mask this fundamental ontological divergence. Ultimately, the author proposes a shift towards "civilised disagreement," which acknowledges that some conflicts are non-resolvable by design, promoting clarity and charity rather than the futile pursuit of forced consensus.👉 https://philosophics.blog/2025/12/15/why-we-keep-talking-past-each-other/

From 2019, "The Truth about Truth," is a philosophical essay that examines the complex and subjective nature of truth and reality, arguing against the concept of a single, objective Truth. The author adopts a non-cognitivist and emotivist perspective, suggesting that people are primarily driven to transmit beliefs (prescriptivism) for survival and community-building, rather than being motivated by objective truth. The essay outlines four main problems with the common assumption that scientific or philosophical inquiry moves humanity closer to an ultimate, approachable reality: specifically, a lack of reference to determine proximity to reality; uncertainty about whether new perceptions move us closer to or further from reality; the primacy of rhetoric in shaping our sense of truth; and the idea that communication intent only converges perception, not objective reality. Ultimately, the author concludes that since humans can only access reality through fallible senses, perception often becomes reality within a given group or meta-narrative. 👉 https://philosophics.blog/2019/12/28/the-truth-about-truth/

The source text presents an argument that even if metaphysical Truth exists objectively and independently of human minds (a position granted for the sake of analysis), it can only become normatively binding for people through rhetorical mediation. The core claim is that the transition from Ontology (what exists) to Authority (what obligates) requires essential steps like identification, description, justification, and ratification, all of which are fundamentally rhetorical processes. The author insists that this focus on access conditions is not relativism but a structural analysis showing that ethical frameworks cannot bypass interpretation and persuasion to generate concrete obligation, analogous to how potential energy must be converted to kinetic energy to perform work. Ultimately, ethical force emerges in the discursive space where claims are argued over, rather than descending fully formed from pure metaphysical ideals.https://philosophics.blog/

The source presents a speculative treatise on social ontology, proposing a framework termed "dialectical spiritual realism" (DSR) that reinterprets the Christian doctrine of the Trinity to model the ideal structure of a flourishing society. This framework defines social reality through the perichoretic, or mutually indwelling, relationship between three irreducible dimensions: Structure, Agency, and Ideology. The author analogically maps these to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, arguing that their interdependence constitutes the generative mechanism for social transformation, which is conceptualised as a secularised form of theosis (developmental movement towards participation in the Good). The text positions DSR as a normatively thickened extension of critical realism and a philosophical grounding for the principles of Catholic Social Teaching, offering a mechanism for analysing social change through the recognition of "structured real absence" (sin) and the emergence of resurrectional rupture (novel, dialectical change).Critique: https://philosophics.blog/2025/12/14/solidarity-as-a-local-moral-grammar/

The source is a critical response to a social and ethical framework proposed by "Otti Vogt," specifically his "Dialectical Spiritual Realist Social Ontology" (DSR). The author is engaging in a philosophical polemic, analysing Vogt's framework—which is grounded in participatory metaphysics, virtue ethics, and an objective Good—through the lenses of their own concepts: the Mediated Encounter Ontology (MEOW) and the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (LIH). The central argument is that while Vogt's ontology is internally coherent and functions well within small, aligned groups, it is fundamentally unsustainable and fails to scale across diverse populations without generating power asymmetries and requiring compliance rather than genuine participation. The critique systematically examines how the framework encounters problems relating to semantic drift, interpretive authority, and the inherent power dynamics that emerge when ethical claims are grounded in an abstract, transcendent moral centre.http://philosophics.blog